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§ 1 - Introduction 
One of the fundamental game theoretic concepts is the core of a coalitional 
game. It is the set of all feasible outcomes that no player or group of participants can 
improve upon by acting for themselves. The core of coalitional games with a finite or 
infinite set of players was investigated in many works (for a comprehensive survey see 
Kannai (1992». In this work we study the core of the class of non-atomic games 
which can be represented in the form v = f 0 J.l where J.l is a finite dimensional vector 
of non-atomic measures and the functionJis non-decreasing, continuous, and concave 
on the range of J.l. Such games occur in several economic applications. For example, 
any non-atomic glove market game and every non-atomic linear production game of 
Billera and Raanan (1981) are of this form and so is any Aumann-Shapley-Shubik 
market game of an atomless economy with a finite number of types (see Section 4). 
We can also view these games as large production games where J.l represents the 
distribution of production factors among the owners and f is the production function. 
Our main result is a representation theorem for the core of a non-atomic game of 
the above-mentioned form which is stated in terms of the subgradients of the functionJ 
(see Theorem A). As a consequence of the representation theorem we show that a 
game of the above-mentioned form is balanced (i.e., it has a non-empty core) iffthe 
functionJis homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of the range of J.l. The 
game is totally balanced iffthe functionJis homogeneous of degree one in the entire 
range of J.l . 
In the last section of the paper (see Section 4) we apply our main results to some 
non-atomic games which occur in economic applications. 
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§2 - Preliminaries 
In this section we define some basic notions which are relevant to our work and 
prove a preliminary result which we use in the sequel. 
Let(T,.E)be a measurable space, i.e., Tis a set and.E is a (5 -field of subsets of 
T. We refer to the members of T as players and to those of.E as coalitions. A 
coalitional game, or simply a game on (T, .E), is a function v:.E ~ m with v(0) = o. 
A game v on (T,.E) is continuous at S E.E if for all sequences {Sn} :=1 of coalitions 
00 
such that Sn + 1 :2 Sn and u Sn = S , and all sequences {Sn} 00_ 1 of coalitions such n=1 /1-
00 
that Sn+i ~ Sn and n Sn = S, we have v(Sn) ~ v(S). 
n=1 
A payoff measure in a game v is a bounded finitely additive measure 
k I ~ 91 which satisfies)c(T)::; v(T). The core ofa game v, denoted by Core(v), is 
the set of all payoff measures A such that ,,1,( S) ~ v( S) for all S E .E. As observed by 
Schmeidler (see the first part of the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Schmeilder (1972)), if v is 
a continuous game at T, then every member of Core (v) is countably additive. 
We denote by ba = ba(T, I) the Banach space of all bounded finitely additive 
measures on ( T, .E) with the variation norm. If,Ll is a countably additive measure on 
(T, I) we denote by bar ,Ll) = ba(T, I,,Ll) the subspace of ba which consists of all 
bounded finitely additive measures on (T, I) which vanish on the ,Ll-measure zero sets 
in I . The subspace of ba which consists of all bounded countably additive measures 
on ( T, .E) is denoted by ca = car T, .E). If,Ll is a measure in ca then 
car fI) = ca(T,.E, fI) denotes the set of all members of ca which are absolutely 
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continuous with respect to f.i. If A is a subset of an ordered vector space we denote by 
A+ the set of all non-negative members of A. 
Let K be a convex subset of a Euclidean space and let J: K ~ 91 be a concave 
function. A vector p is a subgradient offat x EK if J(y) - f(x)::; p .(y - x) for all 
y E K.· Note that the functionfis differentiable at a point x in the relative interior of K 
iff it has a unique sub gradient at x which, in this case, coincides with the gradient 
vector. The set of all sub gradients of J at x will be denoted by 0 J (x). It is well 
known that if x is a point in the relative interior of K then of (x) :f:. 0 (see, for 
example, page 23 in Holmes (1975)). A functionJ defined on a set A ~ 91"' is called 
non-decreasing if for every x, yEA we have x ~ y implies J (x) ~ / (y ) (for two 
vectors x = (x],. ", x l1l ) and y = (y ]'''''Y111) in mm the notation x ~ y means that 
Xi ~ Yi for all 1::; i ::; m ). 
The following proposition will be useful in the sequel. 
Proposition 2.1 
Let K be a non-empty compact convex subset of 9l~ sllch that 0 E K and let 
f: K ~ 9l be a continllol/s, non-decreasing, and concave/unction. Then/m' evelY 
xEKnint m~ there exists pEof(x) such that p~O. 
Proof 
For every Y E 9l~ let j(y) = max{/(x) I x E K, x::; y}. Then it is easy to check 
that j is non-decreasing, concave, and continuous on 91~. Since f is 
non-decreasing, we have J (x) = J (x) for every x E K. Therefore for every x E K 
we have 8j(x) ~ 8f(x). Now j is concave on all 9l~. Thereforeoj(y):f:. 0 for 
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every y Eint m~. Since j is non-decreasing on m~, for every y E m~ any 
subgradient of j at y is non-negative (i.e., it has non-negative components). Let 
x E K (lint 'R~. As 8j(x) c 8f(x) , we obtain that of (x) contains a non-negative 
vector. 
§3 - Characterization of the Core ofa Class of Non-Atomic Games 
In this section we state and prove a representation theorem for the core of a 
game v of the form v = f 0 Jl where Jl is a finite dimensional vector of non-atomic 
measures in ca+ andfis a non-decreasing, continuous, and concave function on the 
range of Jl. We also use this theorem to characterize the balanced and totally 
balanced games of this form. 
If It = (Jlj ..... Jlm) is a vector ofa measure in ca we denote by R( Jl) the range of 
Jl. 
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of our paper. 
Theorem A 
Let I' = (1'1 ... ·1'111) be a vector of non-trivial non-atomic measures in ca+. Assume 
that f,' R( 1') ~ 91 + is a non-decreasing continuous concave function such that 
f(O)=O. Then of(Jl(T))::I;0 and the core of the game v=foJl is given by 
Core(v) = {P' JlI pE of( Jl(T)) and p. Jl (T) = f( Jl(T))}. 
In particular. Core(v)::I; 0 iffthere exists p Eof( Jl(T)) such that 
p' Jl (T) = f( p(T)) . 
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The fact that of (p(T)) :f- 0 follows from Proposition 2.1. 
Let M(v) = {p. pi pE of( p(T)) and p. p(T) = f( p(T))} . 
We first show that M (v) ~ Core ( v ). Let A E M (v). Then there exists 
P E of( p(T)) such that p. p(T) = f( p(T)) and A = p. p. Let S E I. Then 
A(S) = A(T) - A(TIS) = f( p(T)) - p. p(TIS) ~ f( p(S)) = v(S). 
Thus, A E Core(v) . 
We now show that Core(v) ~ M(v). We split the proof into several steps. 
Step 1: Let A E Core(v). We show that A is a non-atomic measure in ca+. 
Sincefis continuous on R(,,) , the game v is continuous (T,I). Therefore 
Core(v) c ca+ and thus A E ca+. We show that A is non-atomic. Assume, on the 
contrary, that there exists a coalition A E I which is an atom of A . Then A( A) > 0 . 
Sincefis continuous on R( ,,), there exists a natural number 11 such that 
j (2.1) f(,,(T))-f(,,(T)- ,,(A)) <}c(Aj<l) 
/1 
By Lyapunov's convexity theorem, there exists a partition Aj , ••• , A/1 of A such that 
,,( Ai) = j ,,(A) for every 1 ~ i ~ 11. Since A is an atom of A, there exists 1 ~ i ~ n such 
/1 
that ).( Ai) = ).( A). Now A E Corer v). Therefore 
j 
A( A) = ).( Ai) = }.(T) - }.(TI Ai) ~ f( ,,(T)) - f( p(TI Ai)) = f( ,,(T)) - f( ,,(T) - ,,(A)). 
/1 
But this contradicts (2.1). 
(i) j j j 
Note that p(T) - ,,(A) = (J - J,,(T) + ,,(TI A) is in R( ,,) by Lyapunov's theorem. /1 n n 
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Step 2: Let 2 E Core(v). We will show that for each S E:E there exists pE of( p(T)) 
such that 2( S ) 5, p. p( S ) . 
Let S E £. Since P1"'" I'm and 2 are non-atomic, for every natural number 
n>1 there exists a coalition Sn E£ such that p(Sn)= 1 p(S) and 2(Sn)=~}.,(S), 
. n n 
By Proposition 2.1, for every n there exists Pn E (}f( Jl(TI Sn)) such that Pn c. O. We 
first show that the sequence {Pn} :=2 is bounded. For every n we have 
Therefore 
1 I 
p/1·j.1(T)5,}.(T)- 2(S)+ P/1·j.1(S). 
/1 /1 
Since Pn c. 0, P/1 . 1'( S) 5, P/1 . Jl(T). Therefore 
I 1 (J - )P/1' p(T) 5, 2(T) - }.(S) 5, 2 (T). 
/1 /1 
As p(T»> 0 (i.e., every component of Jl(T) is positive), we obtain that the sequence 
{P/1 } oo_? is bounded and therefore it has a convergent subsequence which converges to a 
/1-~ 
vector P E 91~. It is clear that P E {} f( p(T)). We will show that 2( S) 5, P . p( S ) . 
Indeed, for every n we have 
As 2(T) = f( Jl(T)), we obtain 
Thus }.(S) 5, Pn . Jl(S) for every n. Therefore A(S) 5, p. j.1(S). 
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Step 3: We show that the order of the quantifiers in Step 2 can be reversed, that is, if 
il E Core(v) there exists pE of( Jl(T)) such that il(S) ::; p' Jl(S ) for all S E I . 
I'll 
Let (5 = L Jii . Then (5 is a non-atomic measure in ca+. Let B+ be the positive 
i=l 
unit billl of LoclT, I, (5). Then B+ is a weak*-compact convex subset of Loo(T, I, (5) . 
It is also easy to check that of( Jl(T)) is a (non-empty) convex compact subset of 911'11. 
Define a function H onof (Jl(T)) x B+ by 
Since }" and Jll,'" Jim are absolutely continuous with respect to (5 (il is absolutely 
continuous with respect to (5 by Step 2), by using the Radon-Nikodym Theorem and the 
fact that the weak*-topology on B+ is metrizable, it is straightforward to check that the 
function H is well defined and continuous on of (fl(T)) x B+. It is also easy to see that 
H is affine in each of its variables separately. Thus the sets of( Jl(T)), B+, and the 
function H satisfy the assumptions of Sion's minmax theorem (see Sion (1958», and 
therefore 
(2.2) mill max H(p,g) = max mill H(p,g). 
gEB+ pEO/( J.1(T)) pEO/( J.1(T)) gEB+ 
Define now a function F on B+ by 
F( g) = max H(p,g). 
pEO/( J1(T)) 
Then F is weak*-continuous on B+ (see, for example, Lemma 2.2, page 89 in 
Rosenmuller (1981». By Step 2, for every S E I we have F( is) ~ 0 (where is 
denotes the characteristic function of S). Since(5 is non-atomic on (T, I), the 
characteristic functions are weak*-dense in B+ (see, for example, Lemma 3, p. 106 in 
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Holmes (1975) or Proposition 22.4 in Aumann and Shapley (1974)). Therefore by the 
continuity of F, we have F( g) ~ 0 for all g E B+. Hence, min F( g) ~ 0 and thus by 
gEB+ 
(2.2), max min H(P,g) ~ O. Therefore there exists p Eof( p(T)) such that 
pEO/( f.J(T)) gEB+ 
H( p,g) ~ 0 for all g E B+. In particular, H( p,ls) ~ 0 for all S E I. Thus, 
Now J" and p. p are two measures in ca such that A( S) ~ p. p( S) for every 
S E I and A.(T) = p. p(T). Therefore we must have A = p. p. Thus A E M(v). 
Q.E.D. 
The following remark is useful in applications of Theorem A. 
Remark 3.1 
Let j:91.~ -+ 91. be an extension of the function f of Theorem A (i.e., j(x) = f(x) for 
every x E R( JI)) which is non-decreasing, continuous, and concave on 91.~ (such an 
extension always exists as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.1). Then 
since of (x) ~ of ( x) for every x E R( JI) , exactly the same proof of that of Theorem A 
yields that the core of the game v = fop is given by 
Core(v) = {p. JlI pE oJ( JI(T)) and p. JI(T) = f( !1(T))} 
If f is a function which is defined on a neighborhood of point x E mm and 
differentiable at x we denote by Vf(x) the gradient of f at x. 
Corollary 3.2 
Let (Jl1 , ... ,JlI11) be a vector of non-trivial non-atomic measures in ca+. Assume that 
f: 91. ~ -+ 91. is continllous non-decreasing concave function which is differentiable at 
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fl(T) and satisfies/(O) = O. Then the core o/the game v = / 0 fl is non-empty if! 
V/ (fl(T))· fl(T) = / (fl(T)). Moreover, if Core (v ) ::t 0 then Core (v ) = {V/ (fl(T))· fl } . 
A game v on (T,};) is called balanced if it has a non-empty core. 
The following theorem shows that if fl is a finite dimensional vector of non-atomic 
. 
measures in ca+andfis a continuous non-decreasing and concave function on R( fl) with 
/ (0) = 0 then balancedness of the game v = / 0 fl is equivalent to homogeneity of degree 
one off along the diagonal of R( fl) . 
Theorem 3.3 
Let p be afinite dimensional vector of non-trivial nOll-atomic measures in ca+. Assume 
that f: R( p) --) 9t is a continuous non-decreasing concave function which satisfies 
f (0) = O. Then the game v = f 0 fl is balanced if! for evelY 0 ~ a ~ 1 we have 
f( afl(T)) = af( p(T)) (i.e·,fis homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of 
R(p)). 
We first assume that the game v = / 0 p is balanced and show that f is homogeneous of 
degree one along the diagonal of R( p). Let 0 ~ a ~ 1. Since f is concave on R( fl) , 
f( ap(T))? af( p(T)). We show that f( afl(T)) ~ af( fl(T)). Indeed, let 
). E Core(v). By Lyapunov's convexity theorem, there exists SE}; such that 
p(S)=ap(T) and }.(S)=aA(T). As A ECore(v), 
af( fl(T)) = a }.(T) = A(S)? f( fl(S)) = f( a fl(T))· 
Hence, f(ap(T)) = af(p(T)). 
We now assume thatfis homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of R( fl) 
and show that the game v = f 0 fl is balanced. By Theorem A, it is enough to show that 
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there exists P E of( p(T)) such that p. p(T) = f ( p(T)). By Proposition 2.1, for every 
natural number 11 > 1 there exists PI1 E 0 f( (J - 1) p(T)) such that p 11 ~ 0 . As f (0) = 0 , 
11 
for every 11 we have 
1 1 
-0::; f((1- )p(T))-(J- )pl1·p(T). 
.1111 
Hence, 
1 1 (J - ,) PI1 . p(T) ::; f ((1 - ;;J Ji(T)) . 
Sincefis continuous and p(T»> 0 , the sequence {PI1 t)-? is bounded. 
11-_ 
Therefore it has a subsequence which converges to a vector P E 91~. It is clear that 
P E C f( p(T)) and p' p( T) ::; f ( p( T)). On the other hand, since 
Pn E cf((J - ~) Ji(T)) andfis homogeneous of degree one, for every 11 we have 
1 I 1 1 f (,,(T)) ::; f((J - ) Ji(T)) + Pn' Ji(T) = (J - )f( Ji(T)) + Pn' Ji(T) . 
11 n 11 11 
Thus, PI1 . p(T) ~ f (Ji(T)) for every 11. Therefore p. Ji(T) ~ f ( Ji(T)), and this 
completes the proof that Core (v ) -:j::. 0. Q.E.D. 
Let SE I. Denote Is = {Q E I IQ c S}. Then Is is a (J -field of subsets of S. 
Let v be a game on (T, I), and let S E I. The su bgame of v which is determined by S is 
the game Vs on (S, IS) which is given by vs(Q) = v(Q) for every Q EIS' A game v 
on (T, I) is called totally balanced if for every S E I we have Core ( vS) -:j::. 0 . 
The following theorem shows that if Ji is a finite dimensional vector of non-atomic 
measures in ca + and f is a continuous non-decreasing concave function on R( Ji) with 
f (0) = 0, then total balancedness of the game v = f 0 Ji is equivalent to homogeneity of 
degree one off on all R( Ji). 
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Theorem 3.4 
Let JI be afinite dimensional vector o/non-atomic measures in ca+. Assume that 
f: R( JI) ~ 91 is a non-decreasing continuous and concave function which satisfies 
/ (0) = O. Then the game v = / 0 JI is totally balanced if! f is homogeneous of degree 
one on 'R( JI) (i.e., fa x) = af(x) for every x ER( JI) and 0 ~ a ~ 1). 
Proof 
We first show that if the game v = f 0 JI is totally balanced then f is homogeneous of 
degree one on R( JI). Let 0 ~ a ~ 1 and SE,E. Sincef is concave on R( JI), 
f (af.1(S)) ~ af( f.1(S)). Let le E Core(vS)' By Lyapunov's convexity theorem, there 
exists Q E.E.s such that I.(Q) = a2 (S) and JI(Q) = aJl (S). As 2(S) = f( JI (S)) , by a 
similar argument to that which was used in the proof of Theorem 4.3 we obtain that 
/ (af.1 (S)) ~ af( f.1(S)). Therefore/is homogeneous of degree one on R( JI). 
We assume now that/is homogeneous of degree one on R( JI) and show that the 
game v = f 0 JI is totally balanced. Let S E,E. We will show that Core(vs):t:. 0. Let 
jJ be the restriction of JI to (S,,E s) and j be the restriction of f to R( jJ). Then 
Vs = j 0 jJ. Since j is continuous, non-decreasing, concave and homogeneous of degree 
one on R( jJ), by Theorem 3.3, Core(vs):t:. 0. Q.E.D. 
In the light of Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 it will be useful to give an example of a function 
f which is defined on the range R of a vector of non-atomic measures on a measurable 
space and such thatfis continuous, non-decreasing and concave onR, frO) = O,/is 
homogeneous of degree one along the diagonal of R, but/is not homogeneous of degree 
one in the entire range R. Indeed, let R be the unit square in 91 2 (R is, for example, the 
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range of the vector (A j, A 2) when the measureable space is [0, 2] with its Borel 
subsets, A j is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] and A 2 is the Lebesgue measure on 
[1, 2]). Define a functionJ on R by 
J(X,y) = ~xy (J-s(x- y/), 
where 0 < s < 10 -7 . It is clear that J is continuous on R and homogeneous of degree one 
along the diagonal of R but not in all R. It is also easy to check (by computing the partial 
derivatives) thatJis non-decreasing. A direct computation gives that the Hessian of Jis 
negative semi definite on R. ThereforeJis concave on R. 
§4 - Applications 
In this section we apply Theorem A to games which arise in economic applications. 
We start with the non-atomic glove market game whose core was studied in Billera and 
Raanan (1981) and Einy et al. (1996). 
Let 1'1, ... ,1'111 be non-atomic measures in ca +. The non-atomic glove market game 
is defined by 
1'(5) = mil1( pl(5), ... ,Pnl5)) for every 5 E I. 
Billera and Raanan (see Billera and Raanan (1981), Corollary 2.7) proved that the core of 
v coincides with the convex hull of the set M = {Ji i I i = 1, ... ,m and Ji i (T) = v(T)}. We 
now derive this result from Theorem A. It is clear that Mc Core (v ). Since Core(\'l is 
convex, co M ~ Corer v) (co M denotes the convex hull of M). Define now 
j:9~~ -+R by j:(Xj, ... ,xm)=min(xj, ... ,xm ). LetA ECore(v), then by Remark 3.1, 
there exists pE aj( p(T)) such that p. Ji(T) = v(T) and A = p. Ji. It is clear that p ~ 0 
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m 
and Pi = 0 for every i in which f.1iCT) > v(T). Therefore v(T) = v(TiLJPi . Now if 
i=l 
m 
v(T) = 0 the result is trivial. If v(T) > 0 then "L.Pi =1 and thus Core(v)c;;;;.coM. 
i=l 
We consider now a pure exchange economy E in which the commodity space is 
. 
9~ ~. The traders' space is represented by a measure space (T, l:, f.1), where T is the set 
of traders and f.1 is a non-atomic probability measure on l:. A coalition is a member of 
;;. An assignment C of commodity bundles to traders) is an integrable function 
x: T ~ 91~. There is a fixed initial assignment OJ. (OJ (t) represents the initial bundle 
density of trader t.) We assume that frOJd,u» o. An allocation is an assignment 
x such that frx df.1 :::;; frOJ df.1. Each trader t ET has a utility junction Ut: 91~ ~ 91+. 
We first study the case in which all the traders in the economy E have the same 
utility function 11 which is continuous, non-decreasing, concave and homogeneous of 
degree one on 91~. The Aumann-Shapley-Shubik market game which is associated with 
the economy E (see Section 30 of Chapter VI in Aumann and Shapley (1974)) in this 
special case is defined by 
(4.1) v( S) = sup {f s u( x (t)) df.11 x is an allocation such that f SX df.1 = f sOJ df.1} . 
Proposition 4.1 
Assllme that evelY trader in the economy E has the same utility junction 
u: 91 ~I ~ 91 which is continuous, non-decreasing, concave, homogeneous oj degree one, 
and satisfies 11(0) = o. Let v be the market game which is defined in (4.1). Then/or 
evelY S El: we have v(S) = urj
s
OJdf.1) and 
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Proof 
From the definition ofv it is clear that for every SE I we have v(S) ~ uds(i)d,u). Let 
S E i. Since u is concave and homogeneous of degree one, by Jensen's inequality, for 
every allocation x such that Isx d,u = Ism d,u we have Isu(x)d,u ::; ud
s
m d,u). 
Therefore v( S) ::; u( Is (i) d,u) and thus v( S) = u( Ism d,u). Now (4.2) follows from 
Theorem 3.3 and Theorem A. Q.E.D. 
Note that since the function U of Proposition 4.1 is homogeneous of degree one on 
91 ~ , every p E ou( IT m d,u) is a vector of competitive prices which corresponds to a 
transferable utility competitive equilibrium of the economy E (see Section 32 on page 184 
of Aumann and Shapley (1974)). 
We now apply Theorem A to the case when the economy E has a finite number of 
types. 
Two traders in the economy E are of the same type if they have identical initial 
bundles and identical utility functions. We assume that the number of different types of 
traders in E is finite and it will be denoted by n. For every 1::; i ::; 11 we denote by Tj the 
set of traders of type i. We assume that Tj is measurable and ,u(Tj) > o. The utility 
function of the traders of type i will be denoted by Uj, and their initial bundle by mj. We 
assume that for every 1::; i ::; 11, Uj is non-decreasing, concave, and continuous on 9t~ . 
The Aumann-Shapley-Shubik market game which is associated with the economy E 
in the case of a finite number of types is 
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(4.2) v(S) = sup {if u;(x(t))dfJ Ix is an allocation such that f xdfJ = f OJdfJ}. 
i=l Sn7; S S 
Define now a function f:9l~ x 9l~ -+ 9l by 
Then by Lemma 39.9 of Aumann and Shapley (1974), fis concave, continuous, 
non-decreasing, and homogeneous of degree one on 9l ~ x 91 ~ . 
Proposition 4.2 
Let v be the market games which is given by (4.2). Define an (n+m)-dimensional vector 
of nOll-atomic measures; on I; by 
Lelf be the junction v,;hich is defined in (4.3). Then v = f 0; and 
(4.4) Core(v) = {p.; I pE of( ;(l])}. 
By Lemma 39.16of Aumann and Shapley (see also Lemma 4.6 in Dubey and Neyman 
(1981», for every S E I; we have v(S) = f( ;(S)). Since/is continuous, concave, 
non-decreasing, and homogeneous of degree one on 91~+m (e.g., Lemma 39.9 of 
Aumann and Shapley (1974», (4.4) follows from Theorem 3.3 and Theorem A. Q.E.D. 
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